framework for the caring professions, and psychiatry in standing their fellow human beings. Nietzsche himself lived well before the upheavals in Europe in the 20th cenparticular. This is particularly crucial, we would suggest, because the search for theories and philosophies of care tury had begun and is therefore not directly responsible for his adoption by the Nazis over 30 years after his death. has yielded at best superficial grasp of what philosophies are. In providing this discussion of Nietzsche, we are seek-Indeed, he regarded nationalism as a 'vulgar prejudice' and prefigured the political concerns of the present day by ing to remedy this by examining some of the key ideas of this thinker and working their implications through some taking pride in being a 'good European' (Sabine 1963 p. 892). aspects of therapy and care.
To begin by providing some background to this project, A further way in which we can gain a grip on Nietzsche and his ideas is to compare him to some of the other figures Nietzsche's work takes its place in a historical line of philosophy which sought to make sense of human existence with whom he is roughly contemporaneous. Stern (1978) claims that Nietzsche is one of three modern thinkers and come to terms with what often seemed to be the futility and suffering that this entailed. The period in which without whom modern Europe would be very different.
The other two were Marx and Freud. As Stern argues, Nietzsche was working owes some of its intellectual features to Schopenhauer (1788-1860, see Schopenhauer all three inform our lives in ways that many of us are unaware, and they are part of our inheritance from an age 1935), who emphasized the central role of the human will as the creative, primary factor in understanding. when belief in the power of ideas was pre-eminent.
Though they differed in terms of biography, geography and Subsequently, after Nietzsche's death, the existentialists, notably Sartre (1905 Sartre ( -1980 and Heidegger (1889 Heidegger ( -1976 , intellectual orientation, they shared many aspirations in common. For example all three aimed to uncover or dissee, e.g. Heidegger 1927 Heidegger , 1977 took up his ideas. Sartre's fusion of phenomenology and Marxism emphasizes the cover what was concealed in the human mind and by changing it change their (and our) perceptions of the human capacity to negate and rebel against structures of authority and resist social control or 'seriation' (see, inter world. All three sought to divest those who had the social, economic, religious and political power and who forced alia, Sartre 1969 Sartre , 1974 . These latter philosophers argued that there was no ultimate purpose in the world, and that or seduced their constructions of reality on others, many of whom were powerless to resist. They were avowed athepeople are forced into a 'desperate autonomy' where they are faced with choosing their goals, perspectives and even ists who saw belief in God as symptomatic of people's weakness and subordination. They all sought to replace it their characters. In this perspective, moments of anxiety, dread or nausea are those in which truths are revealed by an alternative belief system involving self-reliance and self-assertion. Nietzsche is often associated with the 'Death most clearly. This is most graphically established at the end of Sartre's Nausea (1938 /1963 when Antoine of God' -an event announced by 'the madman' in The Gay Science (1882) -but this event also brought with it Roquetin's disturbed perception invites the breakthrough of the 'true' absurdity which lies concealed behind 'pre-what Nietzsche saw to be the death of Christianity. As a consequence of the death of God, truthfulness and truth dictable' reality. A fascination with nature's ultimately futile, rank disorderlinesss over which we cast our fragile claims come under attack.
Nietzsche differs from Marx and Freud in that he saw webs of rationality has been a recurring theme for existential writers. It is thus not surprising that these European the loss of religious belief as having a more profound and in some ways more negative effect on our experience. In traditions of thought have proved attractive to thinkers seeking to comprehend the specifically human disorders terms of his understanding of the foundations of human knowledge too, Nietzsche differed. He recognized that of psychiatry.
Existentialism has of course influenced psychiatry whatever was being said in philosophy, science or everyday life, it was context specific. He insisted on the diathrough the work of Laing, Cooper and Esterson. Laing introduced a thorough questioning of psychiatry in The chronic or historically context-bound nature of language, and implied that science may only be short-lived as a Divided Self (1960) . This was extended to a critique of institutions such as the family (Laing & Esterson 1964 , means of knowing about the world. In this view, attempting to discuss the human condition could only be Cooper 1972 Cooper , 1973 . However, we know far less about the possible contribution of Nietzsche. Perhaps one reason done within the conventions of the time and accounts of human nature would thus be lurid with whatever conwhy Nietzsche has been neglected in the mental health professions is his posthumous association with fascism. cepts, values and tacit theories were intellectually modish.
For Nietzsche, there was no escape from what he called His popularity with the Nazi Party lent his work morally suspect connotations it has still not entirely shed. It might 'the prison house of language'. The mediation of language necessarily introduced distortions and served to mask the seem strange to advocate studying the work of a man who has been associated with totalitarian ideologies. However, reality it sought to describe. Indeed, the ideas of being and substance with which mainstream science is preoccupied we feel there are residues in his writing that are of the utmost interest to those who are concerned with under-are fostered by language and are ultimately illusions. The language structure of predicate and object does not reflect 1858. Attended Schulpforta, Germany's most famous boarding school. He proved a brilliant classical scholar. a prior reality but is the means whereby order, simplicity and identity are imposed on the world (Haar 1977 (Haar , 1864 . Graduated in classics from the University of Bonn.
1865. Began to take an interest in philosophy, especially Butler 1990 (It was felt by some of his colleagues that he was helped (Giddens 1971) . Freud too sought to give the impression that what he was doing was driven by scientific, logical in securing this post by the historian Jakob Burckhardt).
1869. Volunteered to work as a medical orderly in the thought. His development of psychoanalysis was for him a direct outgrowth of his early studies of brain histology Franco-Prussian war.
1870. Took sick leave in the Swiss Alps. The Birth of (Strachey 1973 , Freud 1935 . In contrast to this, Nietzsche presented his philosophy as if it were fiction. Tragedy was published. The only review said 'anyone who has written a thing like that is finished as a scholar'. Reading it is like reading a series of impressions -he rarely mentions a premise, an axiom or a conclusion. It is 1871. Went through a 'spiritual crisis', and his life developed a pattern of cures in spas and journeys to the Swiss left to the astute reader to elicit the philosophy that drives his works. He was profoundly sceptical of all truth claims. Alps, combined with his university duties at Basle.
1872. Resigned his chair, speaking of his 'shattered health'. For him all language was metaphorical -it is through language that we attempt to penetrate reality, but we often He wrote, 'In the middle of life I am so surrounded by death that it may take me at any hour'. cannot get any further than an examination of the language we use and not the reality that allegedly lies behind it.
1873. He commenced writing Ecce Homo and Zarathustra and completed The Joyous or Gay Science. Towards the All three thinkers were German, but very different Germans. Marx was a Rhenish-Prussian Jewish intellectual end of the year he wrote to his friend Gast 'I have long periods of depression. I think of myself as the scrawl which who spent most of his life in exile. Freud was a Moravian German speaking doctor of orthodox Jewish background an unknown power scribbles across a sheet of paper, to try out a new pen'. He fell in love with a Russian girl, Lou who would have been very happy to live his comfortable life in Imperial Vienna had not his destiny been shaped Von Salome, who rejected him. He felt bitterly let down.
In a letter to her he said, 'What do my fantasies matter to by the reaction of other people to his theorizing.
All three have been styled 'masters of suspicion' or pro-you? Even my truths have not mattered to you. I should like you to ponder that I am a headache-plagued, half lunaponents of a 'hermeneutics of suspicion' in that they saw human rationality as a mask for class struggle, unconscious tic, crazed by too much solitude. If I cannot discover the alchemists' trick of turning even filth into gold, then I conflicts or the will to power (Hollinger 1994 p. 69 ). Whereas the debate over Freud's ideas in mental health am lost'.
1874. Thus Spake Zarathustra published. Wagner died and psychotherapy continues to the present day, and Marxist scholars have made inroads into the understand-and Nietzsche went into further emotional turbulence. He decided to leave Germany. He celebrated his freedom in a ing of consciousness (e.g. Leonard 1984 , Parker & Spears 1996 , Nietzsche has been studied far less. It is our inten-letter to his friend Overbeck: 'I am now in all probability the most independent man in Europe. My goals and tasks tion therefore to develop some ideas as to what a Nietzschian perspective in mental health might look like. reach wider than those of anyone else. I flatter myself that with this book I have brought the German language to its To grasp further the significance of Nietzsche's work, let us begin by considering some fragments of his biography, peak of perfection. My style is a dance, a playing with symmetries of all kinds and a leapfrogging and mocking as these will lend focus to our arguments about his contemporary relevance in mental health.
of those symmetries'. 1886-1888. Very prolific. Three books, Beyond Good and Evil, The Genealogy of Morals and The Will to Power were Some brief biographical notes on Nietzsche published. In 1889 he decided to travel to Italy and on his birthday 1844. Born in Saxony, named after the King of Prussia (Friedrich Wilhelm). Members of both sides of his family he received a letter from his sister in which she stated that she thought he was becoming famous, 'though none but a were Lutheran pastors. 1845. It was mentioned in a school report that he appeared fine set of riff-raff and a few smart Jews know it'.
Later that year in Turin he collapsed. He complained of withdrawn and mixed little with other children. He was also absent from school for long periods because of head-exhaustion and explained how happiness had avoided him. He was diagnosed as having 'paralysis progressiva' aches and pain in the eyes.
(tertiary syphilis). He realized the irony of his situation. romantic history, including the history of Germany which was hastily being fabricated in a frenzy of patriotic fervour Here, in Turin surrounded by theatres, museums, good music, excellent food and congenial company, he felt that by politically compliant historians, was delusional.
He was profoundly suspicious of professional historians he was dying. Some weeks later he wrote to Jakob Burckhardt: 'Dear Professor, in the end I would have much trying to find truths, laws or principles in archives. He was not interested in superficial facts, but was more concerned preferred being a Basle Professor to being God'. Some time later he caused a commotion in a Turin square by throwing with deep structures of knowledge and the shifts that have taken place in how we tell the story of the evolution of his arms around an old cart horse and refusing to let go. He was taken back to his home in Jenna where his mother 'man'. History for Nietzsche is impossible, instead it is a creative form of dreaming, as in his book The Birth of and sister looked after him for the next 12 years. During that time Elizabeth, his sister, in a letter to a friend said Tragedy (1872 Tragedy ( /1966 . Historical writing should be inspirational, it is a discourse and interpretation of the past. 'he lingers on gentle and childlike, incapable of coherent thought'.
Moreover, Nietzsche is urging us to hate history. As he said, 'History is a nightmare from which I am trying to He died in August 1900. After his death his friend Overbeck wrote, 'To me it seems quite possible that he did waken'. History is about battles, suffering, misery and hatred. That is the past in general, and our own past in not bring madness into life with him, but that it was a product of his way of life. I could not entirely resist the particular. History in his view, is studied so we can see where civilization has come from. Our past is cruel, barthought that Nietzsche's illness was simulated, an impression derived from my long-standing experience of baric and full of suffering. It is in this context particularly important to note the role Nietzsche assigned to the 'will his habit of taking on many different masks' (based on Stern 1978) .
to truth'. This resulted, he felt, in the decadence and nihilism which were characteristics of modernity. The will to truth itself was a problem as he saw an inevitable cruelty
NIETZSCHE AND HISTORY
in truth-orientated habits of thought. That is, because of the intimate relationship between truth and morality, Presenting a 'history' of Nietzsche is an irony which he himself might have appreciated. He was intensely scepti-truths confront humans with a kind of violence, in terms of their tendency to coerce our thought and action into cal of history in all its established forms and it was partly this scepticism that made his work attractive to many line with these imperatives (Lovibond 1994 p. 64). It is this suspicion of truth that has particular critical implications of those, like Michel Foucault (inter alia 1977 , 1983 who sought to dismantle the 'grand narratives' of the for therapy.
Embedded in this point of view is a scepticism of sociEnlightenment. Nietzsche was one of the first to challenge this European and American optimism about science and ally legitimated systems of changing individuals. As
Nietzsche was a man who felt he had been abused and rationality and the belief that diligent, rigorous scholarship would eventually yield the secrets of history. Nietzsche is deserted by medicine, we can see how the medical and psychiatric knowledge of his day might seem like a very often called the first postmodernist because of his radical scepticism of the form of knowledge we call 'history'. blunt instrument indeed, forcing its patients physically and morally into a mould which might constrain the florid Nietzsche's work forms a turning point in how we look at history and it is worth describing his viewpoint in more excesses of their disease but could not, by definition, cure them. detail as this has relevance for all of our stories about nature, whether these be couched in the form of literature, In Nietzsche's view there is an uneasy relationship between ourselves and our history. We can come to terms myth or science.
As a true sceptic, Nietzsche repudiated what he saw to with it by accepting it and transcending it. This is achieved by constructing who we are in the future. Happiness can be the dominant kinds of historiography of his time, where historians sought a place alongside the natural sciences, only exist when we forget the past. Too much preoccupation with the past induces pessimism and this can stifle emphasizing the accuracy and empirical precision of their discipline and seeking to establish cause and effect and thwart our progress. If we do not forget the past we cannot grow up. But we cannot grow up unless we study relationships. Against this positivistic optimism Nietzsche argued that history could not be all about fact-grabbing or history and forget it. History is the art of containing pessimism and optimism. History is about understanding that constructing chronologies. Moreover, he asserted the futility of attempting to establish laws or principles about we contain within us the past, the present and the future.
The past is what we were, the present is what we are but humans over time. Examining traces others have left behind, he thought, could only ever yield a partial picture. who we are is in the future. For Nietzsche, what we can become is who we are. It is sometimes as if Nietzsche is Curiously, for a thinker who was later associated with the might of an expanding German nation state, he vehemently advocating a kind of amnesia. The histories we have, suffused with inadequate moralities and guilt, could opposed heroic, monumental or epic story-telling. This eventually be transcended. As Lovibond (1994 p. 64) puts In Nietzsche's view, science and official forms of knowledge exist not because they are defensible according to it: 'Nietzsche permits himself the dream of a post moral condition of ''second innocence''. This would consist not some theory of knowledge or epistemology, but because they are 'good enough' to transact particular kinds of social in a renunciation of violence, injury and exploitation, but in forgetfulness of the guilt imputed to us by the moral business. In the same way clients can be taken to have views of the world, epistemologies and forms of thinking interpretation of existence.' Thus, we are led to a vision of the 'philosophers' of the future, the '… strong, affirm-which have hitherto been 'good enough' for them. If we persist in applying the master narrative that they have, ative ubermenschen' -the supermen who can live without god or metaphysical consolations, and who can '… say, 'faulty cognitions' we are never going to make sense of what is going on. Indeed, our attempts to help, however, pave the way to a new set of horizons, a new place for values that affirm life by way of self-differentiation.' well intentioned, may just as easily consolidate the problems rather than resolve them. Indeed, a great deal of the (Hollinger 1994 p. 105 ).
This intimate relationship between histories of the self internal machinery proposed by psychology and psychiatry has sought to identify dishonourable motives and histories of the culture has clear parallels with issues in psychotherapy. A whole slew of therapies, whether they behind our conduct. The most classic example here is the Freudian concern with hidden sexual and aggressive be psychoanalytic, client-centred, cognitive behavioural or of some other theoretical stripe seek to reinterpret the indi-drives which may be revealed by the astute clinical gaze.
But these assumptions of the inadequacy of clients can be vidual's past learning and replace this with apparently more productive ways of dealing with the future. Let us argued to inhabit other regimes of therapy too. Ellis's rational emotive therapy is predicated on the assumption consider some of the implications for therapy in more detail in the next section.
that people have irrational beliefs about what is necessary in life (Ellis 1957 (Ellis , 1984 ). Beck's cognitive therapy assumes that people's negative self beliefs are sustained by 'errors'
TAKING NIETZSCHE SERIOUSLY, TAKING
or 'biases' in logic (Beck et al. 1979) . In his widely popu-
CLIENTS SERIOUSLY: BEYOND THERAPY
larized gestalt therapy Perls (1947 Perls ( , 1970 often expressed
AND REHABILITATION
the view that clients had to be moved away from their existing ideas about themselves and towards the theraOn the face of it then, Nietzsche has something to say about psychotherapy. But in some ways his vision is altog-pists' view of what they are feeling and doing at that exact moment. In the latter case especially, there is very little ether more radical and perhaps is less easy for theories of therapy and rehabilitation to assimilate. Let us try to challenge to the authority of the therapist to be the arbiter of what it is exactly that the client is doing. explain this latter possibility in more detail. There is a strong sense that Nietzsche is saying that a great deal of In addition, a good deal of the therapy and rehabilitation which is offered to clients is predicated on the notion that nature and our knowledge of it is fundamentally a human construction and arises out of human activity. It is this they not only have deficiencies, but that if they remedy these, by learning new coping skills, by gaining qualiwhich places Nietzsche as an early postmodernist. Nietzsche was sceptical also about claims concerning fications or by redeveloping their identities into more socially acceptable forms, their lives will improve. nature. In the Genealogy of Morals he argues: 'there is no ''being'' behind doing, effecting, becoming: ''the doer'' is Clearly, it is easy to agree that it is better to be able to feed yourself and dress yourself than have someone else merely a fiction added to the deed -the deed is everything' (Nietzsche 1887 (Nietzsche /1969 .
do it for you. We would not seek to undermine efforts toward improving clients' autonomy. But what concerns It is possible to identify parallels between this concern on Nietzsche's part and many contemporary concerns in us is the subtle and not so subtle ways in which clients might be encouraged toward ideals which might involve the literature about therapy with clients' world-views, narratives, phenomenology and the like. In addition there is them in distress and frustration later. Let us suppose that as part of their recovery, we are involved in trying to a growing fascination with the language of psychiatry and psychotherapy and the power issues embedded therein encourage our clients to find employment. In addition to contending with the discouraging state of the labour (DeVaris 1994 , Brown et al. 1996 , Owen 1995 . If we accept that as 'bungled animals' (Nietzsche 1887 (Nietzsche /1969 we human market, clients often have to deal with equally discouraging attitudes on the part of employers. So what is it we are beings construct our worlds, natures and sciences, then it is important to acknowledge that clients do the same. urging clients towards? From a more critical perspective perhaps it could be argued that we are regulating, managThis enables us to move beyond thinking about clients in terms of 'delusions', 'dysfunctional cognitions', 'nega-ing or reprogramming clients. This concern can lead us in two directions. First, to what extent is psychiatric knowltive self-image', as having some kind of deficiency in coping skills or some accidental anomaly of their edge and health care part of a coercive regime? Second, what alternatives are produced by taking this point of neurotransmitters.
view? In other words can we perhaps urge people to enjoy
We are not saying that people with mental health problems should have to endure poverty, homelessness and the fruits which can be achieved with less debilitating personal labours? discrimination. However, it is equally important to be aware that they have a kind of privileged access to the In relation to the first point, as far as Nietzsche is concerned the problem of coercion lies with the very nature texture of nature. Because by the time a person becomes a client, one of the factors that brings them into contact with of knowledge itself. His analysis of knowledge invariably draws attention to the way knowledge is not simply a professionals is the way that mainstream versions of the world have not worked for them. Instead of limiting their collection of facts or set of procedures for adjudicating between competing theories. Power is crucial to disjunctures with reality, therapy could build on this rather than try to eliminate it. This has parallels with some Nietzsche's understanding of systems of knowledgethey are enforced through power relations. The scientific of the movements in contemporary mental health, in terms of self help groups, 'Survivors Speak Out', 'Hearing Voices' tradition, from the 18th century Enlightenment to the present day would have it that truth claims can be verified at groups and the like.
Let us consider further the implications for mental 'the tribunal of reason'. This however, is for Nietzsche a kind of bureaucratic ruse -a way of masking the powerful health care embedded in Nietzsche's own biography. In some ways it might serve as an example of 'coping' with interests at stake in establishing a course of action as desirable (Nietzsche 1886 , 1888 /1968b , Lovibond 1994 . illness. This is a man who was troubled by a variety of physical, mental and interpersonal problems throughout Subsequently, the philosopher Paul Feyerabend said 'Helping people does not mean kicking them around until his life and yet was able to contribute in substantial ways to twentieth century culture. This highlights a neglected they end up in someone else's paradise' (Feyerabend 1987 p. 305) . From a feminist perspective too, Marion Young area of research. Much has been done on people who are admitted to hospital and who are thus in a position to be (1987 p. 62) also condemns the idea of an apparently impartial reason as an authoritarian construct.
interviewed, brain-scanned and fill in questionnaires. But we know far less about what makes up quality of life and As far as the second point is concerned, an important implication of Nietzsche's thinking in relation to how cli-productivity outside the institution.
As part of the process of self-knowledge and thus selfents can be rehabilitated and helped concerns his exhortations to 'love one's fate'. This has more recent echoes in mastery, Nietzsche develops a schema containing the following components, on which he felt it was important to the recommendation of the ethnomethodologist Harvey Sacks (e.g. 1972) : 'Be interested in what you've got'. This base understanding of oneself and understanding of the world: suggests to us a less-often noted possibility in mental health. That is, perhaps we should be concerned with the 1 Ontology -the overarching theory about past and future. development of clients' existing assets. Here again, 2 Ethics -doing what we know to be right. through his own failing mental and physical health, 3 Work on oneself -recognizing the 'Last Man' and the Nietzsche provides us with an example. That is, his being 'Oberman' within us (we shall comment further on these an invalid gave him an asset which most of us lacksub-components of the self later). leisure. By implication maybe there are ways of enabling 4 Teleos -Seeing our fate and accepting it. clients to make the most of this at minimum cost, for example by thinking about philosophy. There are importIn addition to this, Nietzsche is often remembered for his emphasis on the 'will' -often in the form of 'will to ant senses in which clients may be made more happy as they are; rather than being made more like some ideal of power ' (431/1968a) . However, his position on this issue was profoundly ambivalent. Willing liberates us, but in so an employed, responsibility-encumbered middle class person. It is this 'being interested in what you've got' or doing the will becomes a prisoner and can only ever be a passive observer of the past. The search for self-mastery loving your fate which could have substantial therapeutic implications. Moreover, the effects of the state of one's owes some of its origins to Goethe (1749-1832) who propounded similar theories (e.g. Robertson 1932 , Goeth health on one's thinking were of paramount concern to Nietzsche himself. He said 'A philosopher who has tra-1952). The person, as Nietzsche would have it, is properly engaged when 'giving style to one's character' (Nietzsche versed many kinds of health, and keeps traversing them, has passed through an equal number of philosophies. He 1882/1974 p. 290) -to 'become what we are' (Nietzsche 1882 (Nietzsche /1974 . In other words, to realize one's own simply cannot keep from transposing his states every time into the most spiritual form and distance. This art of measure of value creating energy, without falling into disorientation or incoherence (Lovibond 1994 p. 70) . transfiguration is philosophy' (Nietzsche 1882 (Nietzsche /1974 . In this way, Nietzsche had perhaps grasped the We can understand Nietzsche's 'schema' as a way of thinking about selves -especially selves whose ration-'alchemists' trick of turning even filth into gold' and achieved, via this transfiguration, the art of producing ality has been challenged, as is often the case with people who become clients. Despite his adherence to the concerns 'fruits without labour'. in his 'schema' above, he was also drawn to '… the an early age this client had looked to buses as a status symbol. As he said: 'Jeez! I'd walk a street and say, ''If I ''impurities'' of desire, spontaneity and passion, something a little fleshy and wild, something of the long-was a bigshot I'd be on the bus right now!'' ' (Angrosino 1994 p. 22) . Says Angrosino (1994 p. 22) '… it was a dream missing and sublimated Dionysian spirit' (Hughes 1996 p. 31) . Therefore, selves, especially as they are embodied, for him and gave shape and meaning to his life'.
Consequently, history and context are crucial in making escape rationality. Indeed Nietzsche argues against the privilege usually attached to consciousness and reason.
sense of these local rationalities. It is precisely how we make sense of ourselves and others that we shall turn to If rationalities are profoundly local and are often under challenge or under erasure, this perhaps describes some-in the next section. thing that 'mental patients' have to contend with very often. That is, if the rationality of our knowledge, thinking REFLEXIVITY AND RATIONALITY and history is local rather than universal this explains how it can come to be challenged by more powerful versions One of the key features of Nietzschian thought is that he prefigured a number of contemporary concerns with of the 'truth'. It is a frequent complaint from clients and ex-clients of mental health services that everything they reflexivity. That is, he was concerned about how the knower can come to know him or herself. This has some say is interpreted in terms of their diagnosis. This has been noted in a number of more academic studies too -most parallels with the idea about reflexivity in social science and in terms of a number of concerns in the mental health famously in Rosenhan's (1973) 'Being sane in insane places'. Having been admitted to hospital by claiming to professions about reflective practitioners and reflecting teams. There are several senses in which the notion of hear voices, his otherwise 'sane' colleagues were understood to be displaying signs of 'mental illness'. For reflexivity can be developed from Nietzsche's thought, which we shall consider. example, whilst making notes, these pseudo-patients were described in such terms as 'patient engages in writing First, there is a sense of reflexivity in the way he encourages us to think of human nature. As with many roughly behaviour'.
In more recent work, a number of authors have identified contemporary late 19th century thinkers, especially Freud, part of Nietzsche's thought about the self involved the problems faced by patients and ex-patients in managing the challenge to normality which psychiatric developing systems of partitioning the self into different compartments with different tendencies, policies and hospitalization represents. As one of Herman's (1993) informants said:
aims. Let us explore some of the implications of this formulation. To begin with, according to him, we have within selfish. Reconciling these two is part of the seeking of that they would understand and pat me on the butt and tell me redemption. Whereas it is easy to see parallels between that it didn't matter to them and that I was OK. S***, it didn't the 'Oberman' and the Freudian 'superego', the 'Last man' work out like I planned -they flipped out on me. Sid couldn't and the 'id', to grasp Nietzsche's implications we need to handle it at all and just let out of there in a hurry. Jack stayed see that both of these are informed by their historical foraround me for about 20 min and then made some excuse and left. mation and both offer us something intelligible. Nietzsche (Herman 1993 p. 314) thus provides for a much more thoroughgoing 'reflexivity' and self understanding than the commonplace variety. Thus, once you have been identified as having a 'mental illness', you have to start from scratch almost every time Consequently, the reflexivity prompted by taking Nietzsche seriously is extremely transgressive and invites you open your mouth and establish your credentials to speak. In a sense this is what Nietzsche had to do too -the disruption of established selves, roles and professional boundaries. For a man who strove against dominant repinsofar as he was trying to say something different about knowledge than most of the other thinkers up to that time. resentations of rationality and order in the intellectual life of his time, Nietzsche offers the mental health professional Moreover, Nietzsche, in so doing, made it more obvious how partial and incomplete the authority and credentials a set of troubling questions. What if the patients have got a point? What if the epistemological privilege of proof other leading intellectuals were.
A further implication of this idea that rationality is local fessional logics-in-use (Hawes 1977 ) is established through social practice and not through scientific rationality? rather than universal in working with clients is that once we understand their lives, behaviour which might seem
The troubles invited by these considerations can perhaps be avoided by grasping the opportunities they afford. inexplicable in a clinical setting becomes intelligible. As Angrosino (1994) documents, a young man's concern with Again, Nietzsche's own example is instructive. If we are to love our 'fate' -his recipe for human happiness, buses which appeared odd in an institutional setting made sense once Angrosino had ridden on buses with him. From after all -then we must embrace this demolition. The
